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Abstract There is an increasing need for norms to be embedded in technology as
the widespread deployment of applications such as autonomous driving, warfare and
big data analysis for crime fighting and counter-terrorism becomes ever closer.
Current approaches to norms in multi-agent systems tend either to simply make
prohibited actions unavailable, or to provide a set of rules (principles) which the
agent is obliged to follow, either as part of its design or to avoid sanctions and
punishments. In this paper we argue for the position that agents should be equipped
with the ability to reason about a system’s norms, by reasoning about the social and
moral values that norms are designed to serve; that is, perform the sort of moral
reasoning we expect of humans. In particular we highlight the need for such rea-
soning when circumstances are such that the rules should arguably be broken, so
that the reasoning can guide agents in deciding whether to comply with the norms
and, if violation is desirable, how best to violate them. One approach to enabling
this is to make use of an argumentation scheme based on values and designed for
practical reasoning: arguments for and against actions are generated using this
scheme and agents choose between actions based on their preferences over these
values. Moral reasoning then requires that agents have an acceptable set of values
and an acceptable ordering on their values. We first discuss how this approach can
be used to think about and justify norms in general, and then discuss how this
reasoning can be used to think about when norms should be violated, and the form
this violation should take. We illustrate how value based reasoning can be used to
This paper is a revised, extended and consolidated version of several previous papers: Bench-Capon
(2016a, b), Bench-Capon and Modgil (2016a, b).
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decide when and how to violate a norm using a road traffic example. We also briefly
consider what makes an ordering on values acceptable, and how such an ordering
might be determined.
1 Introduction
Norms are a topic of considerable interest in agent systems (Walker and Wooldridge
1995; Shoham and Tennenholtz 1997; Wooldridge and van der Hoek 2005; Moor
2006; van der Hoek et al. 2007; Sen and Airiau 2007; Savarimuthu et al. 2008;
A˚gotnes and Wooldridge 2010; Sugawara 2011; Mahmoud et al. 2015). An early
position paper, Moor (2006), set out to argue for the importance (and difficulty) of
making machines behave ethically. Moor distinguished between implicit ethical
systems (now usually termed regimented systems) and explicit ethical systems,
based on rules and principles, and often employing deontic logics. This distinction
still applies to most approaches to ethical or normative agents systems today. The
importance of ethical systems, he argued, would grow as ‘‘future machines will
likely have increased control and autonomy . . .. More powerful machines need more
powerful machine ethics’’. Indeed this is now the case, as in the decade since Moor
was writing, autonomous systems acting in the real world have become more and
more a part of our reality, and recent successes in artificially intelligent technologies
have prompted prominent researchers to argue for the urgency of research into
ethical systems (Russell et al. 2016).
Moor suggested that implicit ethical systems could be regarded as moral agents,
even though ‘‘Of course, such machine virtues are task specific and rather limited.
Computers don’t have the practical wisdom that Aristotle thought we use when
applying our virtues.’’ But not all philosophers would agree that implicit ethical
agents were ethical at all: Kant, for example, argues in Kant (1785) that actions
done in accordance with the law only have moral worth if they are also done for the
sake of the law. This seems correct: acting in accordance with what is right deserves
no praise if it is impossible to act otherwise. None the less, perhaps, if we are
unleashing agents in the real world, it is enough that they act in conformity with the
law: moral worth is perhaps not an issue with machines.
However, regimented (Moor’s ‘implicit ethical’) agents are designed to act in a
limited, predictable environment, whereas the real world is not predictable, and
unforeseen situations will arise. In these open systems, regimentation of behaviour
by restricting agents to performing only permissible actions (e.g. Esteva et al. 2002;
van der Hoek et al. 2007; A˚gotnes et al. 2009) does not allow agents to adapt to
such unforeseen circumstances. Moreover, unlike norms found in legal and moral
systems, such norms cannot be violated, and so it can be argued (e.g. Jones and
Sergot 1992; Governatori 2015) that they should not be seen as norms all, because
the agents have no choice beyond compliance or non-participation. Such rules are
thus more like the rules of a game, than moral and legal norms.
We therefore argue that agents in open systems should have the capacity to
explicitly reason about the actions they perform, and in particular whether or not
behaving according to normative prescriptions is in accordance with ethical criteria
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that these norms are designed to serve, so that if necessary agents may choose to
violate norms. Again, as argued by Moor: ‘‘more powerful machines need more
powerful machine ethics’’. However, this raises the question as to what are the
ethical criteria by which ‘explicit ethical agents’ should choose which norms to
adhere to. While quantitative utilitarian calculations may suffice in simple
scenarios,1 more complex scenarios characteristic of real world moral dilemmas
are not typically resolvable through such calculations (Dennet 1995). What is
required is a computational account of practical reasoning that equates with what
Moor called the ‘‘practical wisdom of the type that Aristotle thought we use when
applying our virtues’’. Practical reasoning has been investigated both within the
standard multi-agent system context of beliefs, desires and intentions (BDI, e.g. Rao
and Georgeff (1991)), in work such as Broersen et al. (2001), and, with ethical
considerations at the forefront, through the combination of deontic, epistemic and
action logics (van Den Hoven and Lokhorst 2002). These approaches do not directly
address the issue of how to rationally choose amongst options for action by
appealing to ethical criteria. However, since 2006 when Moor was writing, there has
been growing interest in the use of argumentation theory in the context of practical
reasoning in order to resolve such conflicts (e.g., Rahwan and Amgoud 2006), and
in particular Value-Based Reasoning and Argumenation as in Atkinson and Bench-
Capon (2007) and Verheij (2016), in which the ethical criteria appealed to take the
form of values promoted by actions and the relative importance (ranking) of these
values. We will argue for the position that Value-Based Reasoning, especially in the
manner of work based on the approach of Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2007), is one
way to provide current and coming agents whose autonomy and operation will place
them in unforeseen situations. where they must recognise the need to violate their
norms, and to violate them in the most appropriate way, with the capacity to make
such choices.2
Of course, we do not advocate that value based reasoning and argumentation
suffices on its own as a formalism for explicit ethical agents; comprehensive formal
models may well require the integration of such reasoning with BDI and deontic
logics, and possibly also the integration of quantitative and qualitative reasoning.
Rather, the purpose of this paper is to propose that value based reasoning and
argumentation is able to play an important role in equipping agents with the ability
to reason about norms and related ethical considerations, and to therefore also be
able to deal with unforeseen situations. We will support our position by illustrating
1 See for example a variation of the trolley problem setup (Bonnefon et al. 2016) in which a utilitarian
autonomous vehicle will choose to direct itself so as to minimise the number of casualties.
2 One of the anonymous reviewers stated ‘‘formal works in this field often aim to provide mathematical
theorems, e.g., to relate the expressive power of a logic with the question of computational complexity
that arise from this logic.. . . It is by no means obvious that mathematically oriented researchers in the
field are committed to the claim that values should be left out. The fact that the focus has been on norms
(in the crude sense of forbidding transitions) might have more to do with the present state of our formal
modelling capabilities.’’ Such formal concerns, and the need to overcome some of the limitations, are the
basis of the REINS project described in Broersen (2014). We do not challenge this, but argue that the
move towards Moor’s full ethical agents, for example by the inclusion of the ability to reason to with
values, and to enable them to violate norms, will be needed if autonomous agents such as driverless cars
are to be deployed in practice.
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use of value based formalisms for reasoning about norms using associated values
characteristic of societies of increasing complexity, and how agents may then need
to justify violation of norms in order to ensure promotion of the values that these
norms were intended to serve.
We now further elaborate on some of the approaches mentioned above, by way of
then introducing value based reasoning and argumentation. We will consider how
value based reasoning can be used to justify norms given certain scenarios, and how
differences in the values, preferences and state descriptions affect the norms that can
be justified.
An excellent starting point for considering reasoning about norms is Ullmann-
Margalit (1977), which does, of course, considerably pre-date multi agent systems,
but none the less contains many relevant considerations. In that work, Ullmann-
Margalit uses as scenarios on which to base her discussion of norms, simple two
player games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD, Rapoport and Chammah 1965).
In such games there are two players and each can cooperate or defect, and their
choices determine the payoffs. In PD as used in Ullmann-Margalit (1977), mutual
cooperation gives a payoff of three to each player and mutual defection one to each
player, while if the actions differ the defector receives five and the cooperator
receives zero. Some key results concerning PD are that the Nash Equilibrium (Roth
and Murnighan 1978) is where both defect (since defection is the dominant action,
and will receive the better payoff whatever the other player does) and that a
successful strategy in iterated PD (where the players play one another repeatedly) is
Tit-For-Tat (Axelrod 1987, but see Binmore 1998). Using Tit-For-Tat an agent will
cooperate in the first round, and then copy its opponent’s previous move in every
subsequent round. Importantly PD is a non-zero sum game: the aggregate utility of
mutual cooperation is greater than any other payoff, and the equilibrium in fact
yields the lowest collective utility. Thus, it would in fact be mutually beneficial if
one offered a payment to the other if they cooperated: this could secure a payoff of
three and two, so that both would gain over mutual defection. Such agreements are,
however, not possible in normal versions of the game, which do not allow for prior
negotiations.
Public goods games have formed the basis of several studies of the emergence of
norms in multi-agent systems such as Shoham and Tennenholtz (1997), Sen and
Airiau (2007), Skyrms (2014), Bicchieri (2005), Sugawara (2011) and Mahmoud
et al. (2015). Empirical studies suggest, however, that applying standard game
theory3 to public goods games does not provide a very realistic model of actual
human behaviour. Experiments using such games are very common and have
formed the subject of a number of metastudies. For example Engel (2011) examined
131 examples of the Dictator Game and Oosterbeek et al. (2004) was based on 37
papers reporting Ultimatum Game experiments. In none of these many studies was
the canonical model of game theory and economics4 followed. Although the study
3 In which, as in classical economics, players are all rational, self-interested and perfectly informed and
act so as to maximise their own utility.
4 In which, in the example of the Ultimatuatum Game, the proposer would offer the smallest amount
possible, and the recipient would accept any offer, no matter how small.
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of Henrich et al. (2001) looked at fewer societies (fifteen), it is particularly
interesting in that the studies considered highly homogeneous societies, and used the
same methodology for each experiment. Again none of the societies followed the
canonical model. Consequently it is not plausible to see the canonical game
theoretic models, and their criteria such as the Nash Equilibrium, as justification for
the norms encountered in such societies.
Another approach is to model scenarios as State Transition Diagrams (STD), and
to investigate how norms can be designed in such situations to avoid unwanted
states of affairs as in Wooldridge and van der Hoek (2005) and A˚gotnes and
Wooldridge (2010). In these approaches, agents are typically represented using the
Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) model (Rao and Georgeff 1991; Wooldridge 2009),
inspired by Bratman (1999). The BDI model supposes agents to have a set of beliefs
and a set of dispositional goals (desires). Actions are chosen by identifying the
desires that can be realised in the current situation (candidate intentions), and then
committing to one or more of these intentions, and choosing a course of action
intended to realise the associated goals. This, however, leaves open the question of
where the desires come from in the first place. This in turn means that in BDI
systems, there is no explanation of where goals come from. Often they are
completely fixed, and even in systems where they can be derived from the current
state (e.g. Rahwan and Amgoud 2006), there is a fixed set of potential desires some
of which are active in a given situation, which means that we can say why the desire
is active, but not why there is such a desire to activate. This inability to justify
desires greatly limits the ability to engage in moral reasoning in a transparent
fashion.
This paper proposes use of an alternative approach to action selection, often
called practical reasoning (Raz 1979) and formalised as Value-Based Reasoning, as
a means to enable agents to justify norms by reasoning about the social and moral
values that norms are designed to serve; that is, the kinds of moral reasoning we
expect of humans. Agents are associated with a set of social values, the aspirations
or the purposes an agent might pursue, such as liberty, equality, fraternity, wealth,
health and happiness. These values provide reasons why certain situations are
considered goals by the agent, and so allows for the justification of ‘‘desires’’, as
explained in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2016). The basic idea is that agents have a
set of such values and their aspirations and preferences are characterised by their
ordering of these social values. Attempting to promote (or avoid the demotion of)
preferred values provides reasons for desiring some states of affairs, and for
choosing particular actions. In the context of argumentation based models of
reasoning, an ordering on values can be conceptualised as an audience to which the
arguments are addressed (Perelman 1971), and acceptance of an argument as to
what to do depends not only on the argument itself—for it must, of course, be a
sound argument—but also on the audience addressed. This notion of audience as an
ordering on values was computationally modelled in Grasso et al. (2000) and made
more formal in Value-Based Argumentation Frameworks (VAFs, Bench-Capon
2003). VAFs are an extension of the abstract Argumentation Frameworks (AFs)
introduced in Dung (1995), but whereas in an AF an argument is defeated by any
attacking argument, in a VAF an argument is defeated for an audience by an
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attacker only if the value associated with the attacking argument is ranked at least as
highly as the attacked argument by that audience. In this way different audiences
will accept different sets of arguments (preferred semantics (Dung 1995) is used to
determine acceptance), and, as is shown in Bench-Capon (2003), provided the VAF
contains no cycles in the same value, there will be a unique non-empty preferred
extension.
Use of VAFs provides a way of explaining (and computing) the different
arguments accepted by different audiences. Value-Based Reasoning has been used
as the basis of practical reasoning in, amongst others, Garcez et al. (2005), Atkinson
and Bench-Capon (2007), and van der Weide et al. (2011), and applied in particular
areas including law (Bench-Capon et al. 2005), e-democracy (Cartwright and
Atkinson 2009), policy analysis (Tremblay and Abi-Zeid 2016), medicine (Atkinson
et al. 2006), experimental economics (Bench-Capon et al. 2012), rule compliance
(Burgemeestre et al. 2011), decision support (Nawwab et al. 2008) and even
ontology alignment (Trojahn et al. 2008; Payne and Tamma 2015). Complexity
results for VAFs were established in Dunne (2010) and Nofal et al. (2014). Here we
will discuss norms and their design and justification in terms of the Value-Based
approach to practical reasoning.
In Sect. 2 we review background work on the formalisation of Value Based
Argumentation in Alternate Action Based Transition Systems (AATS) (Wooldridge
and van der Hoek 2005). These systems model open agent systems (qua models of
‘worlds’ in which agents engage in joint actions to bring about desired states of
affairs). Section 3 then shows how this approach enables reasoning about and
justifying the norms that serve values and value orderings characteristic of societies
of increasing complexity. Section 4 further explores the use of such reasoning by
agents who may need to justify violation of norms in order to ensure promotion of
the values that these norms were intended to serve. We also briefly consider what
makes an ordering on values acceptable, and how such an ordering might be
determined, in Sect. 5. We conclude with some reflective discussion and point to
future work in Sects. 6 and 7.
2 Background
In this section we provide some essential background: the structure which we use to
model our ‘‘world’’, Alternate Action Based Transition Systems (AATS); the value-
based arguments that agents can generate from such structures and use to justify
their actions in this environment, and; the running example we will use to illustrate
our model.
2.1 Alternate action based transition systems
In open agent systems, an individual’s choice does not necessarily determine the
state that will be reached. To account for this, open agent systems should model
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transitions as the joint actions5 composed of the individual actions of all the agents
relevant to the situation. A suitable variant of state transition diagrams for use in
open agent systems is Action-based Alternating Transition Systems (AATS),
introduced in Wooldridge and van der Hoek (2005), since their transitions are the
joint actions of all the agents relevant to the situation. AATS are formally based on
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (Alur et al. 2002). The basic AATS was
augmented in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2007) to allow the labelling of the
transitions with the values promoted and demoted by that transition. AATSs labelled
in this way were termed Action-based Alternating Transition Systems with Values
(AATS?V) and AATS?Vs were used to provide the underpinning semantical
structure for the approach to practical reasoning set out in that paper. The formal
definitions are given in the following subsection.
2.1.1 Formal definitions
Definition 1 AATS (Wooldridge and van der Hoek 2005). An Action-based
Alternating Transition System (AATS) is an (n ? 7)-tuple S = hQ, q0, Ag, Ac1,...,
Acn, q; s;U; pi, where:
• Q is a finite, non-empty set of states;
• q0 2 Q is the initial state;
• Ag = {1,...,n} is a finite, non-empty set of agents;
• Aci is a finite, non-empty set of actions, for each agi 2 Ag where Aci \ Acj = ;
for all agi 6¼ agj 2 Ag;
• q : Acag ! 2Q is an action pre-condition function, which for each action a 2
Acag defines the set of states qðaÞ from which a may be executed;
• s : Q  JAg ! Q is a partial system transition function, which defines the state
s(q, j) that would result by the performance of j from state q. This function is
partial as not all joint actions are possible in all states;
• U is a finite, non-empty set of atomic propositions; and
• p : Q ! 2U is an interpretation function, which gives the set of primitive
propositions satisfied in each state: if p 2 p(q), then this means that the
propositional variable p is satisfied (equivalently, true) in state q.
AATSs are particularly concerned with the joint actions of the set of agents Ag. jAg
is the joint action of the set of n agents that make up Ag, and is a tuple ha1,...,ani,
where for each aj (where j  n) there is some agi 2 Ag such that aj 2 Aci.
Moreover, there are no two different actions aj and aj0 in jAg that belong to the same
Aci. The set of all joint actions for the set of agents Ag is denoted by JAg, so JAg =Q
i2Ag Aci. Given an element j of JAg and an agent agi 2 Ag, agi’s action in j is
5 Here, as in Alur et al. (2002) and Wooldridge and van der Hoek (2005), by joint action no implication
of the agents acting in concert is intended. A joint action is simply an action composed of actions
performed by a set of agents at the same time, without any suggestion of coordination, or common
purpose. This contrasts with the notion of joint action in e.g. Levesque et al. (1990), which concerns
acting in teams.
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denoted by j i. This definition was extended in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2007) to
allow the transitions to be labelled with the values they promote.
Definition 2 AATS?V (Atkinson and Bench-Capon 2007). Given an AATS, an
AATS?V is defined by adding two additional elements as follows:
• V is a finite, non-empty set of values.
• d : Q  Q  V ! {?, -, =} is a valuation function which defines the status
(promoted (?), demoted (-) or neutral (=)) of a value vu 2 V ascribed to the
transition between two states: d(qx, qy, vu) labels the transition between qx and qy
with one of {?, -, =} with respect to the value vu 2 V.
An Action-based Alternating Transition System with Values (AATS?V) is thus
defined as a (n? 9) tuple S = hQ, q0, Ag, Ac1,..., Acn, q; s;U; p;V ; di. The value may
be ascribed on the basis of the source and target states, or in virtue of an action in
the joint action, where that action has intrinsic value.6
2.2 Reasons for action
The values give agents reasons to perform or not to perform the various actions,
based on the argumentation scheme proposed in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2007).
A number of such reasons are given in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2014) (the ‘‘N’’
suffix denotes reasons not to perform the action: j is a joint action in which agent ag
performs jag, / is a goal, which holds or fails to hold in a given state, and which
agents may attempt to realise, maintain, avoid or remove).
R1We should participate in j in q in which / holds to maintain / and so promote
v.
R2NWe should not participate in j in q in which / holds since it would remove /
and so demote v.
R3We should participate in j in q in which :/ holds to achieve / and so promote
v.
R4NWe should not participate in j in q in which :/ holds since it would avoid /
and so fail to promote v.
R5 We should participate in j in q to ensure / and so promote v. Note that / may
be contingently realised or unrealised in q and that, in some variants, the
promotion of v might not be immediate, or permanent. This also applies to R5N
and R6.
R5N We should not participate in j in q which would ensure :/ and so demote v.
R6 We should participate in j in q to prevent :/ and so promote v. Note that :/
may be contingently realised or unrealised in q.
6 Although the labellings are taken as givens in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2007), it is possible to make
the ascription of values to transitions transparent, and to enable agents to argue about what values should
label a given transition. This was fully discussed in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2016).
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R6N We should not participate in j in q which would prevent / and so fail to
promote v. We suggest that to make the reason worth consideration we should
only use variants which prevent / immediately and permanently.
R7 We should participate in j in q in which :/ to enable / to be achieved and
v to be promoted on the next move.
R8N We should not participate in j in q in which / which will risk / being
removed on the next move which would demote v.
R9 We should participate in j in q because performing jag promotes v.
R9N We should not participate in j in q because performing jag demotes v.
Objections to these arguments can be formed by questioning whether the state is as
claimed, the consequences of the action will be as specified, whether the goal is
realised and whether the value is indeed promoted. The arguments, attacks and
rebuttals of the attacks are then organised in a Value-Based Argumentation
framework (VAF) as described in Bench-Capon (2003) and evaluated according to
an ordering on the values. These value orderings will depend on the subjective
preferences of the particular audience, and so different agents may quite rationally
choose different actions.
To summarise: three stages in practical reasoning are identified in Atkinson and
Bench-Capon (2007):
• Problem formulation essentially the construction of an AATS?V for the
particular problem situation. The AATS?V will reflect the views of the agent
engaged in the reasoning, and so will embody that agent’s causal model (to
determine the transitions) and its values (to enable the labelling of transitions),
as is demonstrated in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2016). As Atkinson and
Bench-Capon (2016) indicates there can be arguments justifying the formulation
of the problem, before the AATS?V is used in the subsequent stages.
• Epistemic stage this involves determination of what the agent engaged in the
reasoning believes (or chooses to assume) about the current state and the joint
action that will result from the choice of a particular individual action by the
agent concerned;
• Option selection the arguments generated from the AATS?V based on the
reasons given above, and objections and counterexamples to these arguments,
are formed into a VAF and their acceptability status determined according to the
preferences of the agent engaged in the reasoning. The acceptability status
determines which actions, according to its beliefs, values and preferences, the
agent can justifiably choose to perform.
In the work mentioned above, and in the examples below, value preferences are
considered pairwise. In fact transitions may be labelled with several values, so that
the comparison should be between sets of values: our approach is just to use the
most preferred of these values. Use of sets of values was considered in Prakken
(2002), Chorley and Bench-Capon (2005) and Bench-Capon (2011). Also it might
be desirable to consider degrees of promotion of values, as advocated in Sartor
(2010). Such extensions, however, still require further work if a consensus as to the
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best approach is to be achieved, and, since their use does not affect the general
principle of providing agents with the capacity to perform value-based reasoning,
we will continue with the simple pairwise comparisons in this paper.
2.3 Example
An AATS?V was used in Bex et al. (2014) to model the states and actions found in
both the fable of The Ant and the Grasshopper (Aesop 1909) and the parable of The
Prodigal Son (Luke 15:11–32). Fables and parables are suitable examples for us
because they are stories with a moral point, and are frequently used in the moral
education of children. In The Ant and the Grasshopper, the story is that during the
summer the grasshopper sings and plays while the ant works hard storing up food
for the winter. When the winter comes, the grasshopper has no food; nor will the ant
give away any of its store, and so the grasshopper dies. In The Prodigal Son the
prodigal wastes his inheritance on idle play but when destitute asks his father for
forgiveness; the father does forgive and takes him back into his household.
An AATS?V based on the model of Bex et al. (2014) is shown in Fig. 1. In our
example, food is sufficiently abundant in summer that one can gather food and eat
without effort. Growing food for the winter is, however, a full time effort (digging,
planting, weeding, reaping, storing) and produces a surplus, but the nature of the
activity is that it is either done or not: the amount produced is not proportional to the
effort. The food cannot be stored over the summer: therefore the winter ends with a
Fig. 1 AATS?V for the Example: w work, p play, a ask, g give, r refuse, e eat, f feast, d die. The same
AATS?V is used for both the fable and the parable. Joint actions give that action of the ant/father,
followed by that of the grasshopper/son. States are vectors of five propositions representing: ant/father
alive, grasshopper/son alive, ant/father has food. grasshopper/son has food, season is summer,
respectively
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period of carnival (q5, q8 and q12) when the surplus is consumed with feasting. The
state has five propositions. The first two indicate whether the ant (father) and the
grasshopper (son) are alive, the third represents whether the ant (father) has no food
(0), enough (1) or abundant food (2), the fourth similarly represents whether the
grasshopper (son) has no, enough or abundant food, and the fifth whether it is
summer (1) or winter (0). Thus the initial state, q1 is 11001, indicating that both are
alive, neither has food and that it is summer. Now, if both work and the state
becomes q3, 11220 indicates that both are alive, both have abundant food and that it
is winter. The key decisions are in the initial state (q1) where the grasshopper and
the prodigal choose to play (action p) while the ant and the father choose to work
(action w), thus transitioning to q6, and in q6 where the ant refuses the grasshopper
(action r), so transitioning to q7, while the father gives to the prodigal (action g), so
transitioning to q5. In the other states there are no choices to be made.
We have labelled the diagram in Fig. 1 with just four values. Life for the ant
(father) and grasshopper (son) (La and Lg) and Pleasure for the ant (father) and the
grasshopper (son) (Pa and Pg). Additional value labels will be identified as our
discussion proceeds.
3 Justifying norms with value based argumentation
The basis of our approach is that agents will be faced with situations requiring a
choice of action. They will normally choose the action which has the most favorable
consequences for themselves; in our terms the action which promotes their most
preferred value or set of values. Since different agents will have different
preferences they will, quite reasonably, make different choices. But agents do not
exist in isolation: their choices will impact on other agents, and what other agents
choose will affect the consequences of their own actions. In a social group norms
will develop, or be imposed. These are important where the choices of individuals
may go against the interests of the group, or where additional information about
how others may be expected to act is useful. Norms may be social conventions or
laws. In both these cases they are typically reinforced by sanctions (see Bench-
Capon 2015). Legal norms are typically backed by formal sanctions such as fines
and imprisonment, whereas social norms are backed by informal sanctions such as
ostracism, ridicule or perhaps just disapproving looks.
There are also moral norms. Conventions and norms may embody moral norms,
and should at least be consistent with them, but unless so embodied, moral norms
are not usually associated with sanctions. Conventions and laws, introducing as they
do the notions of sanctions and punishments, will often be associated with a
purpose, such as to promote the sustainability of the group or society. Simulations
such as Mahmoud et al. (2015) have shown that punishments are essential if
normative collapse is to be avoided: more than that, stability requires that failure to
punish be itself punished.
In this section we consider how a set of norms might develop from a
consideration of value-based practical reasoning in the example scenario.
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3.1 Arguments in q1
We first consider the arguments as to what to do, available to an agent in q1, based
on the values of pleasure and life. The agent’s own pleasure and life will be denoted
Ps and Ls, the pleasure and life of the other as Po and Lo. Our arguments are derived
from the reasons of Sect. 2.2, but here expressed in terms of only the agent’s own
action and the value, e.g. you should perform a since it will promote v, where a is
the agent’s action in the justified joint action, and v is the value promoted.
A You should not play since it will risk Ls being demoted (R4N)
B You should work since it will enable Ps to be promoted (R7)
C You should play to promote Ps (R9)
D You should not work since it will demote Ps(R9N)
Thus we have reasons pro and con working: the pro reason is the future pleasure it
enables (B), and the con reason is the immediate loss of pleasure which
accompanies it (D). Play in contrast affords immediate pleasure (C), but risks the
loss of life (A). The risk associated with argument A is substantial: avoiding death
requires both that the other works, and that the other will forgo its own pleasure in
order to save one’s life. Therefore (assuming life is preferred to pleasure) only the
most risk taking individuals will choose to play in q1.
In the following subsection we will show how this norm can also be explained
and justified in terms of value based reasoning.
3.2 A first set of norms
So let us suppose that the society has the norm:
SN17 It is forbidden to play
If all agents conform to this norm the situation can continue indefinitely round the
loop q1; q3, q5, q1. But there will always be the temptation to violate SN1: the value
Ls is threatened, and if q6 is reached, there is the possibility that the other agent will
give the required food. Work on norms such as that reported in Axelrod (1986) and
Mahmoud et al. (2015) suggests that unless there is some reinforcement mecha-
nism, norms are liable to break down. The reinforcement mechanism is to require
violations to be punished by other members of the group, which in q6 would mean
that food is withheld. Moreover, to avoid the normative collapse demonstrated in
Mahmoud et al. (2015), it is necessary to punish those who do not punish, and so
punishment needs to be seen as obligatory. This in turn means that we need a norm
applicable in q6:
SN2 It is forbidden to give food
7 We use SN for social norms, which can be moral norms, but may also be found, backed with sanctions,
as social and legal norms. We use MN for those norms better seen as purely moral norms, those typically
not incorporated in a social or legal code, and not typically associated with sanctions.
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Refusal to give food could be justified without reference to any norms by an
argument based on R6N, you should not give since that will fail to promote Ps.
Given the counterargument based on R5N, you should not refuse since this will
demote Lo, and so refusal requires a preference for Ps over Lo. But this does seem
selfish rather than moral, and acts against sustainability. It does not seem morally
good to prefer a minor value in respect of oneself to an important value in respect of
the other: in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2008), for example, moral behaviour was
characterised as not regarding lesser values enjoyed by oneself as preferable to more
important values in respect of others, which would oblige the agent to give. We can
however introduce another value, Justice (J), which will justify refusal. This has
some intuitive appeal, since the foodless agent has chosen to be in that position, and
is attempting to take advantage of the efforts of the other. Thus recognising justice
as a third value (labelling the transition q6–q7), preferred to Lo, will justify the
punishment of violations of SN1. This would be difficult to justify under a simple
consequentialist perspective proposed in Bentham (1825) (since it means the
grasshopper dies), although it might be possible to recognise Justice in more
sophisticated versions of Utilitarianism by considering the effects of additional,
more remote, consequences of normative collapse and those resulting from
excessive free loading.8 It is more straightforwardly incorporated in virtue ethics
(Aristotle 1962) or deontological (Kant 1785) approaches since it is capable of
universal adoption, and it is not difficult to see a preference for justice as virtuous,
since it can be justified in terms of equity and sustainability, by preventing
freeloading and the collapse of SN1.
The result will be a pair of norms which are capable of resisting collapse,
according to the empirical findings of Mahmoud et al. (2015). The result is a rather
puritan society (relieved only by a brief period of hedonism), based on subsistence
farming, with a strong work ethic, and an aversion to what in the UK is currently
termed a ‘‘something for nothing’’ society. An alternative would be to introduce a
fourth value, Mercy, that labels the transition q6–q5, and is preferred to Justice. This
preference is very possibly the recommendation of the parable of The Prodigal Son,
and would also allow society to continue, at the expense of a sacrifice of pleasure by
the ant/father. But it is a feature of the parable that the son repents, and there is a
tacit understanding that the son will not repeat the pattern, but will choose work in
future. We might therefore wish to modify SN2 to something like:
• SN2a It is allowed to give food only once,
which would permit the giving of food. We might wish to go further and to
accompany this with:
• SN2b It is obligatory to meet the first request for food.
This would represent a preference for Mercy, but enforce a two strikes and you are
out policy, so that Justice is still respected. It also opens the possibility for the ant to
8 Mill may himself have foreseen the problem and arguably advocated rule rather than act utilitarianism:
(see Urmson 1953).
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play at the grasshopper’s expense on some future cycle (cf. children supporting
elderly parents). Whereas simply removing SN2 would lead to the possibility of
exploitation, and so devalue Justice, the pair of norms SN2a and SN2b retain due
respect for Justice, while allowing scope for Mercy until the object of the mercy
proves incorrigible. This will require the state vector to have an extra term to record
violations.
We now consider developments beyond the basic scenario of Fig. 1. These will
necessarily be described in less detail, both because of space limitations and because
of the large number of possible variations. Of course it would, in future, be desirable
to extend the scenario at the same level of detail and provide an expanded AATS?V
modelling a more complex society. This would be a very substantial undertaking:
we hope that it is clear that the discussion in the following sections is making use of
the aforementioned techniques.
3.3 Critique
Although the norms SN1 and SN2 (with or without the variants SN2a and SN2b)
will give rise to an equitable and sustainable society, we might expect to see
thinkers in such a society as questioning the worth of the society. There are a
number of grounds for critiques. For example:
• There is no net pleasure in the society: the displeasure of working is offset by the
pleasures of feasting at carnival, but there is no net gain. Such a society lacks
progress and reward and any point beyond it own continuance.
• There is no choice or diversity in the society: the path taken is determined at all
times by the norms, and deviation is effectively punishable by death.
• The pleasure enjoyed in this society is of a rather basic kind, whereas the
pleasure it denies itself might be seen as a higher pleasure. The hard line
utilitarian might adopt the view of Bentham (1825) that ‘‘Prejudice apart, the
game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and
poetry’’, but others, like Mill would disagree: ‘‘it is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied’’ (Mill 1871). Such higher pleasures can only be provided by (certain
forms of) play, not by feasting.
Therefore critics might seek a way of changing the normative code so as to improve
the society in one or more of these respects. Certainly, it is considered essential to a
civilised society that it is able to generate a surplus of food and so allow scope for
the development of arts and sciences, or even the simple enjoyment of leisure time.
There is therefore some push behind finding a justification for allowing some
relaxation of the rigid society represented by SN1 and SN2. In order to further the
discussion we will distinguish between three types of pleasure, by introducing
different values for different pleasurable activities. We will retain P for the bodily
pleasures associated with carnival (feasting and the like): toil will also continue to
demote this value. We will also distinguish between approved activities made
possible by not working (e.g. arts and sciences) which we will term culture (C), and
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deprecated activities (e.g. gaming or mere idleness) which we will term frivolity (F).
We thus need to distinguish between approved play (playa, i.e engagement in
culture producing activities) and deprecated play (playd, i.e. engaging in frivolity).
We might even modify SN2b to give food only to someone in need because of
playa, and to withhold food from those in need as a result of playd.
3.4 Allowing for play and the evolution of more complex societies
There are a number of ways in which we can accommodate agents who play rather
than work. Some require disparity between agents, while others require a
redescription of the world, additional values and a finer grained description of
activities and states.
3.4.1 Power
We first consider a disparity of power. In this situation some agents are sufficiently
more powerful than the others to be able to compel them to surrender their food. We
assume that the powerful agents comprise less than half the population. This is
modelled by changing the ask action for the powerful agents allowing them to
demand, rather than request, food in q6, and to render it impossible to refuse a
demand, so that there is no ra transition between q6 and q7. This removes argument
A for the powerful, since there is no longer any risk in playing because their
demands must be acceded to. Might the powerful play and demand all the food from
the ant so that they can also feast? This would result in the ant starving and so would
be a short term expedient, since the ant would die and the powerful be forced to
work in subsequent years. So we should perhaps have a norm to prevent this:
SN3 It is forbidden to demand non-surplus food.
This can be based on a value preference for the Life of the other over Pleasure.
Remember now that we have distinguished between three types of pleasure so
that argument C needs to be split into two arguments:
• C1: You should playa to promote culture (C).
• C2: You should playd to promote frivolity (F).
Now the powerful will not choose to work unless they prefer their future pleasure
(Ps) to the current C and F afforded by play.
They also have a choice of leisure activity, depending on whether they prefer
culture or frivolity. Of course, a moral preference is built into the names of the
values, and there will be a moral norm, applicable only to the powerful:
MN4 It is forbidden to playd.
Whether MN4 is adopted as a social norm will depend on whether the peer group of
the powerful see themselves as having also a social obligation not to indulge in idle
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pleasures (noblesse oblige).9 MN4 allows the choice to work to be morally
acceptable, since it is comfortable with a preference for physical pleasure over
culture, forbidding only idle pleasures. Alternatively we can represent Mill’s
position that only the higher pleasures are morally worthy with MN4a:
MN4a It is obligatory to playa
(also directed only at the powerful). The problem with both these cases is that this
means that there is one norm for the powerful and one norm for the powerless. To
justify this distinction, there needs to be some kind of social order, recognised by
all, and considered morally acceptable, so that the class difference between those
able to demand food in q6 and those not so able is seen as acceptable. This is not at
all unusual in actual societies: for example Mrs Alexander’s well known hymn All
Things Bright and Beautiful, often seen as particularly directed towards children,
contains the verse (seldom sung these days):
The rich man in his castle, The poor man at his gate, God made them high and
lowly And ordered their estate.
This equates with a preference ordering L  C  P  F that can be advocated
within a Virtue Ethics approach or a Consequentialist approach (indeed given Mill’s
view that not all pleasures are of equal worth, the consequences are an
improvement: since only the powerful can act to promote culture, it is good that
they do so, even if it is at the expense of the powerless, since culture is preferred to
pleasure).
One example of such a society is Feudalism. A good model for such a society is
where some agents own the land and allow tenant farmers to work the land in
exchange for the payment of rent. The nature of such a society is coloured by the
ratio of powerful to powerless. If there are relatively few powerful, they can demand
low rents and so leave some surplus to the tenants and allowing some degree of
feasting to them (so shortening rather than removing the carnival period). This will
also mean that there will be some surplus food available after the needs of the
powerful have been met, some of which can be demanded to give the powerful
pleasure as well as culture.
What is important, for the sustainability of such a society, is that the powerless
respect the social order and do not rise up and overthrow the elite. Revolutions must
be avoided. The social order can be reinforced by including a value deference (D),
promoted by working if one has no power to demand, and by giving when food is
demanded, and so promoted by the transitions q1–q3 and q6–q5. This gives the
powerless arguments to respect the social order, to ‘‘know their place’’. Deference
can reinforce the preference for C over F by being seen as promoted by the
transition using playa and work, but not the transition playd and work (the idle
masters do not command respect). This value recognises two different roles: the
powerful are required to promote culture (MN4a) and the rest are required to enable
them to do so. Acceptance can be reinforced in several ways including patriotism, in
9 It is very uncommon for a norm like MN4 to be enacted as law. The sanction of social ostracism is
typically seen as sufficient deterrent to keep the frivolous down to a sufficiently low number.
44 T. Bench-Capon, S. Modgil
123
which the powerless are encouraged to take pride in the cultural achievements of
their masters; or religion, as in the hymn quoted above. As a further reinforcement,
prudence suggests that the rents should not be too high, since that is likely to push
the workers in a revolutionary direction.
A further possibility is that some workers may be taken out of food production
and used for other purposes of benefit to all, which might be additional cultural
activities (e.g. minstrels), building works (e.g. the pyramids), or whatever, and then
fed from the tribute. Thus, once the despot’s own needs have been considered, the
surplus can be apportioned by them between allowing some retention by its
producers and some public works (‘‘bread and circuses’’). In the models, the fewer
in the powerful class the greater the scope for ameliorating the lot of the powerless,
and hence the more likely the society is to be stable. This also appears to be
supported by some historical examples. In feudal societies it seems that the
powerless suffer more when there is a weak king and squabbling barons than when
there is a powerful king who keeps the barons in check.10 The proportion that is
taken has been investigated in behavioural economics Loewenstein (1999).11 At the
limit, where the classes are equally divided, there is no leeway: there the powerful
require all the surplus.
In addition to Feudalism, there are other models: slavery is one, and the kind of
brigandry depicted in the film the Magnificent Seven is another. But these afford far
less opportunity for keeping the powerless content, and so are liable to breakdown.
In the film the banditry is stopped by force, and slavery was abolished, whereas
Feudalism evolved into a different social order, rather than being abolished or
overthrown (at least in the UK: in France things were ordered differently). The key
distinction is that the powerful restrain their demands so that revolution is not seen
as worthwhile.12 To reinforce this, we often find notions of ‘‘noblesse oblige’’,
which, as remarked above, attempts to persuade the powerful in the direction of
admirable forms of recreation and philanthropy. We will term the associated value
as generosity (G), and it is the quid pro quo of deference. This might form the basis
of the moral norm:
MN5 It is obligatory to be generous in your treatment of the less fortunate
and the ordering: L  C  G  D  J  P  F. We still need C  G because the
point of this social order is to permit playa. G is there to encourage stability, not as
an end in itself. Note that, part of this accommodation is to play down which
persons actually enjoy the various pleasures. Culture is now seen as a public good
and playa a duty. People are expected to promote the values they can, given their
10 For example, in the Robin Hood legends the people favour Richard over his weak brother John.
11 The powerful find themselves in the position of the Dictator in the Dictator Game, or Proposer in the
Ultimatum Game. Both of these have been much studied in behavioral economics (Engel 2011;
Oosterbeek et al. 2004). These studies have suggested that it is rare for people to keep as much as they
can for themselves, and that Respondents in the Ultimatum game will take nothing if offered less than
what they consider to be a fair amount. Explanations for behaviour in the two games in terms of value-
based argumentation can be found in Bench-Capon et al. (2012).
12 In the words of the blues song Custard Pie Blues by Sonny Terry and Brownie McGhee ‘‘You have to
give me some of it, or I’ll take it all away’’.
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social position. We have accordingly omitted the suffices indicating beneficiaries.
Note that MN5 is rarely a legal norm when there is an imbalance of power: it will be
at most adopted as a peer group convention. This may be because of the difficulty of
enforcing sanctions on powerful transgressors, short of revolution. Note, however,
that Generosity could lead the powerless to give away food to the needy: it could
replace Mercy as a motivation for SN2a and SN2b.
3.4.2 Wealth
In post-feudal societies we find that class and disparity remain, but that this disparity
is manifested as wealth rather than physical coercion. In a sense this transition
began in the feudal age, when power began to take the form of (enforceable) land
ownership rather than force of arms.
When wealth is the source of power, the forcibly coercive demands of the
powerful are replaced by the ability to buy the surplus. So here the transition
between q6 and q5 becomes buy and sell rather than ask (or demand) and give. In
this model, selling is not compulsory and so the possibility of reaching q7 is there.
However not selling restricts the hoarder to promoting P and jeopardises Lo,
whereas selling not only avoids demoting Lo, but also opens up the possibility of
enjoying some playa or even playd. For example, by selling half the surplus for two
cycles, a worker would be able to save so as to accumulate sufficient wealth to
spend the third in play of one or the other kinds and then buy food for the winter.
This is the underlying idea of holidays, pensions, and more recently of ‘‘gap years’’.
The balance between how the surplus is distributed between work, playa and playd
can be left to the individuals and so made to depend on the preferences of
individuals, or there may be norms imposing limits. At this point it is useful to
distinguish between values that are maximisers, for which more is always better,
and values which are satisficers13 for which enough can be enough and more is of no
benefit and possibly of harm: for example, one will become sated with too much
feasting.14
In its simplest form, this model should lead to a fair degree of equality, since
eventually the initially wealthy will have spent all their money, and so be forced to
work, since there is no other source of income. There are, however, mechanisms
which tend to allow the wealthy to maintain their position:
• The wealthy may own the land (or the means of production) and be in a position
to take some proportion of the labour of others in the form of rent or profit. The
situation is little different from the feudal, except that payment is now in money,
not in kind. The flexibility afforded by money is more suitable to an Industrial
society where production requires more than land and labour, and where produce
is not bread alone, but a whole range of manufactured goods.
13 The distinction introduced in Simon (1978), although he uses it to describe the attitudes of different
people with respect to a single value, namely ‘utility’. See also Simon (1978), Bench-Capon et al. (2012)
and Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2016)
14 The distinction is similar to that between abstract unreachable goals and abstract goals in Zurek
(2017).
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• The wealthy may choose to lend money at interest. Since many will regard a
‘‘bird in the hand as worth two in the bush’’, there is likely to be takers for such
loans, allowing for people with initial wealth to pay for their needs from the
interest and maintain their wealth, and perhaps even, given sufficient borrowers
or high enough interest rates, to increase it. Note, however, this requires some
way of ensuring that the lenders can be confident that the interest will be paid,
and the debt repaid. This in turn requires some kind of norm, e.g.
SN6a It is obligatory to repay debts.
This would be associated with a new value of Trustworthiness or Honesty (H),
promoted by observance of debts (and contracts and agreements generally) and
demoted by reneging on such agreements. Such agreements are typically
governed not by moral norms alone, but are supported by laws and enforced by
sanctions. In order to make this more general we might prefer to use the
formulation:
SN6 It is obligatory to honour agreements.
• Some people may have access to wealth from outside. For example, in the
sixteenth century the Spanish rulers had a seemingly inexhaustible supply of
gold and silver from the Americas.
• Deference or Generosity may mean that some agents are not required to work or
pay but are simply given some kind of tribute. For example monks or priests
may be supported by tithes or donations, or the infirm by alms. The latter, where
the motivating value is generosity, are perhaps covered by MN5, but modified to
be applicable to all, and to cover all those considered worthy of alms, not just the
unfortunate. Moreover, the notions of tithes (and today contributions to welfare
benefits) are often the subject of law, rather than left to morality.
SN5a It is obligatory to give alms to those unable, for good reason, to support
themselves.
This rephrasing as SN5a means that we broaden the notion of unable to support
themselves from incapacity to include those engaged in some other, worthwhile
but unremunerative, activity. This allows us to subsume Mercy under
Generosity, while the qualification still acknowledges justice as a value.
The introduction of honesty may give a value ordering.
L  H  C  G  D  J  P  F
There is some scope for variation: e.g. P may be ranked higher than J without
causing real problems to our moral vision. It is vital that honesty be given such a
high ranking as there will normally be reasons based on some other value to break
an agreement. Indeed it could be argued that H should even be preferred to Ls since
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it is always possible (and perhaps desirable) to avoid entering agreements which
would risk demoting Ls
We might see a conflict between SN5a and SN2 and its relaxations SN2a and
SN2b. In fact what we are doing is recognising a difference between those who
cannot work, and whose requests should be granted, and those who could work but
choose not to do so.15 The distinction is intended to enforce SN1, but to allow for
some excusable violations (e.g. on the grounds of illness). The notion that norms
will, on occasion, need to be violated, and considered by many (e.g. Jones and
Sergot 1992) to be an essential feature of norms, will be the focus of later sections of
this paper.
3.4.3 Turn taking
In the previous subsection we considered situations with an initial imbalance of
wealth. But it is possible, given recognition of a norm such as SN6, to enable the
beneficial trade of surplus production for opportunities for playa, through the
mechanism of turn-taking. This arrangement, expressed in our model as one agent
plays this year supported by another agent in return for supporting the play of that
agent the following year, is in fact very common as an informal arrangement at the
personal level. Many couples or groups living together will come to such an
arrangement regarding chores, and the idea of ‘‘turn taking’’ is very common
amongst children.16
Turn taking also emerged in the empirical work of Lloyd-Kelly et al. (2014) in
which a society of agents played a number of iterated prisoner’s dilemma games.
The agents had different degrees of tolerance (readiness to punish) and respon-
siveness (readiness to cooperate). What emerged was a number of stable situations:
mutual cooperation and mutual defection, of course, but also some stable turn taking
cycles. These turn taking cycles sometimes benefited the two agents equally, but
even where one gained more from the arrangement than the other, it could still be
beneficial to both, and to their combined score, when compared with mutual
defection. Therefore we might well see such an arrangement emerge, even in an
initially equal society, given that C is preferred to P and there is a reinforcing norm
such as SN6. As has been noted above, such arrangements are likely to be especially
common in domestic situations, where trust is likely to be high. This in turn suggests
that it might be possible to differentiate H according to whom it is directed. It is not
uncommon to regard it as wrong to cheat family and friends (Hf ), dubious to cheat
other individuals (Hi), but acceptable (where possible) to take advantage of large
(‘‘faceless’’) organisations (Ho). Such discrimination is rarely enjoined by any
ethical theory (although it is possible that, in some circumstances, it would be
endorsed by some forms of consequentialism), but is a commonly argued for (and
15 The distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor was a central concern of the UK 1834
Poor Law Amendment Act, and is enjoying a revival in popular attitudes expressed in the UK today. It
contrasts with the underlying philosophy of the UK Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, which saw a
certain minimal level of support as the right of every citizen.
16 Such informal turn taking is usually regulated by the peer group involved in the arrangement, and will
not usually have any written agreements or legally enforceable status.
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practiced) behaviour. Over-claiming on insurance is not uncommon and is seen by
some as a ‘‘victimless’’ crime, suggesting that some might give Ho a very low rank,
perhaps even below F.
3.4.4 Service provision as work
In several of the scenarios discussed previously it came about that because of the
preference for C over some other values, certain agents may be enabled to playa
because the consequent promotion of C was such that other agents were inclined to
support this activity out of their surplus in preference to P. This is likely to be
particularly so in the case of powerful agents who will choose to act as patrons to
certain agents to allow and encourage certain kinds of playa. But similar kinds of
patronage may be attractive to other individuals as well, who may be prepared to
part with a (typically) small part of their surplus to enable particular kinds of playa
by particular agents. It is possible that this may emerge with just two agents. The ant
may find the singing of the grasshopper so entertaining that he is willing to sacrifice
his entire surplus for the privilege of listening to her sing. But, since the singing of a
single grasshopper may entertain a whole colony of ants, it is even more attractive if
the cost of supporting the grasshopper can be shared across a large number of
individuals. Where this is so, a variety of entertainers can be supported, and other
services performed. Money greatly assists this arrangement, and places it on a
formal, contractual footing, so that it falls under SN6. As such we might expect the
emergence of a service and entertainments sector, where some agents were able to
adopt the role of providers of C promoting activities willingly supported by groups
of other agents.
This is likely to be increasingly the case when productivity rises, so that workers
generate larger surpluses. Now we can adjust our notions of the difference between
playa and playd. We can see playa as being non-work activities for which people are
prepared to pay, and playd as non-work activities for which people are not prepared
to pay. This will require consideration of the agent as well as the activity: people
will pay to watch Lionel Messi play football, but no one will pay to watch me play
football. We therefore combine norms SN1 and MN4a into a single norm:
SN1a It is obligatory to playa or to work.
This differs from MN4 because that norm was directed at only a subset of agents
(the powerful), whereas SN1a can be seen as universal. Moreover while MN4 is
generally not supported by laws, SN1a does lend itself to legislation. Interestingly, a
norm like SN1a may be better supported by a system of reward for playa rather than
punishment for playd . Indeed the payment for the services provided for playa may
well be seen in terms of reward for norm compliance. For a discussion of enforcing
norms with rewards rather than punishments see Boer (2014).
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3.4.5 Emergence of a state
As well as choosing to spend their surplus on providing themselves with culture,
through paying others to playa, agents may choose to pay others to do their duties.
In Mahmoud et al. (2015) it was shown empirically that to avoid norms collapsing it
is necessary that they not only be backed by the punishment of violators, but that
those who fail to punish must themselves be punished. Since punishment can have a
cost for the punisher, however, there are often reasons not to punish, and in societies
where violations are comparatively rare, the cost of punishment can fall unevenly
and unpredictably. We saw how punishment for violating SN1 can naturally be
expressed as SN2 (which actually is cost free for the punisher in our model, but
might involve a cost for the punisher in the general case), but when we move to
more sophisticated norms such as SN6, recognising violations may not be
straightforward. Recognising the need to punish is an important aspect of social
cohesion: as expressed in Mahmoud et al. (2015):
This move from enforcement by vigilantes (those taking the law into their own
hands) to seeing law enforcement as the social duty of responsible citizens is
an important milestone in the development of a society that respects its laws.
Once punishment is seen as a social duty it is a small step to organise and pay for a
third party to punish violators. Assuming relatively few law breakers, a small levy
will enable a dedicated agent to be paid to enforce the norms. Of course, non-
payment of the levy will also be subject to punishment. From this it is a small step to
taxation, and the provision of services such as law enforcement by the state, paid for
from these taxes. And if law enforcement, why not other duties? Thus SN5a may be
better observed by contribution to a central fund responsible for identifying those
who should be supported and providing that support, than by individual charity.
In this way States may emerge, first as a Hobbesian Leviathan (Hobbes 1969),
but, once established, available to take on the performance of other duties. Further
the State may take on the role of intervention to resolve conflicts of interest between
its citizens (Chorley et al. 2006), or to educate its citizens (Lloyd-Kelly et al. 2014).
An emergent State may also lead to new values such as self-reliance, freedom and
community, and the relative preferences of these new values, and how they are
promoted and demoted by different models of the State may provide insight into the
form in which the State emerges. In some circumstances the State may take on an
even broader role, and become itself the arbiter of what constitutes playa, by itself
supporting certain activities. Thus we often find subsidies for opera, but never for
football. Of course, allowing the state to determine what counts as culture in this
way will be controversial, and so we may find that we need to distinguish between
two types of playa: high culture as approved by the state and subsidised (playsa) and
popular culture approved by citizens and paid for out of their own retained surplus
(playpa). This provides another example of how increasing the level of sophisti-
cation of the model necessitates the finer grained discrimination of values and
actions.
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In the previous sections, we have discussed in general terms how one might equip
agents to reason about norms and the values they serve, and the sort of norms that
would correspond to such reasoning in various circumstances. We now turn to a
specific use of these reasoning abilities in deciding when non-compliance with (i.e.,
violation of) norms can be justified, and, given there are often several ways in which
norms can be violated, the form such violations should take.
4 Rules are made to be broken
4.1 Why agents might need to violate norms
As observed in Hare (1965), for most people, most of the time, following norms
involves little more than applying a set of learned principles. Hare, however, also
says that there will be occasions when we need to think about a moral problem from
first principles, and that the recognised norms are a useful way of encapsulating the
conclusions of such reasoning for future use. This is a good way of viewing
exceptions to existing norms: an existing norm needs to be violated, a way of
violating it is chosen, and the key elements of the situation can then be captured and
taken forward as an exception to the norm.17 The working out of the automobile
exception to the search provisions of the US Fourth Amendment provides an
example of such a process in law (see Bench-Capon 2011). Hare (1965) says:
What the wiser among us do is to think deeply about the crucial moral
questions, especially those that face us in our own lives, but when we have
arrived at an answer to a particular problem, to crystalize it into a not too
specific or detailed form, so that its salient features may stand out and serve us
again in a like situation without so much thought.
We have already noted that an important reason for thinking in terms of norms is
the recognition that on occasion they need to be violated (Jones and Sergot 1992).
While the norm is intended to provide a useful heuristic to guide behaviour,
allowing for a quick unthinking response, unreflecting adherence to such guidelines
is not what we we expect from a genuinely moral reasoner. Nor should it have been
intended by the norm designer: the wise legislator will be well aware that not every
eventuality can be foreseen,18 and that circumstances may arise in which the norm
is, as Hamlet puts it, ‘‘more honoured in the breach than the observance’’. While
principles may serve well enough most of the time, there are situations in which the
norm should be violated and in these situations we need to think through the
situation from scratch.
The two main approaches to enforcing normative behaviour in MAS are either by
removing prohibited actions (e.g. van der Hoek et al. 2007; A˚gotnes et al. 2009;
Dennis et al. 2016) or by including explicit rules expressing the norms, akin to
17 The similarities with the classic four step retrieve-reuse-revise-retainmodel of case based reasoning in
AI and presented in e.g. Aamodt and Plaza (1994) are clear.
18 The advice to expect the unexpected has been given at least since Heraclitus (c.535 BC–475 BC).
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Asimov’s three principles of Robotics (Asimov 1950). Often such principles are
accompanied by sanctions. Neither are entirely satisfactory. The first gives no scope
for violations, and while this may be adequate (even, by using model checking, such
as Bosˇnacˇki and Dams (1998), provably so) in situations covered by the model, in
real life unexpected and unforeseen events will arise that take us outside the model.
As for principles, at some point they are likely to give rise to conflicts (their main
point as a literary device) or gaps, and unforeseen situations not covered by the
principles will be encountered.19
As an example of the unforeseen suppose that the ant has agreed to pay the
grasshopper for entertaining him during the summer. When making the agreement
the ant may have every intention of keeping the agreement, but suppose that the
harvest fails, and there is no surplus to pay the grasshopper. Should the ant follow
the norm, pay the grasshopper and starve himself, or renege on the agreement and
watch the grasshopper starve? Here we will have a genuine moral dilemma in which
the ant must choose between justice and its life. The ant may choose death before
dishonour, but may also choose to renege with good authority. Thomas Aquinas
writes:
if the need be so manifest and urgent that it is evident that the present need
must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is
in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is
lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another’s property, by
taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or
robbery.20 (Aquinas 2012, Question 66, Article 6).
Thus the ant has a choice, and either option can be justified. What the ant will do
will depend on its value preferences. Arguably the original contract was
foolhardy—on the part of both—since the failure of the harvest could have been
foreseen by both parties, and whichever suffers has only themselves to blame.
A common real world example in which actions are made unavailable is erecting
bollards to prevent vehicles from entering a park (to use the famous example of Hart
2012). What can be wrong with this approach? After all, we can prove that the
undesirable situation the bollards are intended to prevent will not be reached, either
using model checking (e.g. Bosˇnacˇki and Dams 1998) or analytic methods. Thus we
can prove that universal compliance with the norm will achieve the desired
results—as long as the situation is covered by the model. But suppose some state not
modelled arises: perhaps someone has a heart attack in the middle of the park and so
it is essential for an ambulance to enter the park in order to save that person’s life.
Now the bollards will prevent the person from being saved, and the object of the
norm, i.e. the value that the norm is designed to serve, the safety of park users, will
be demoted rather than promoted. While the norm is effective in an ideal world, we
do not live in an ideal world, and in a sub-ideal world it is often the case that
adhering to the norms applicable to an ideal world will not lead to the most desirable
19 That the ‘‘rules will run out’’ has been a key driver of AI and Law research since the days of Gardner
(1984).
20 This would, of course, also justify the grasshopper stealing from the ant.
52 T. Bench-Capon, S. Modgil
123
results.21 Similar considerations arise from obeying laws and principles: there is a
conflict between the obligation to provide medical assistance and the obligation to
exclude vehicles from the park. While any set of principles may provide good
guidance most of the time, it is not difficult to think of situations where following
the principles will lead to undesirable results, and so need to be disregarded. The
problem is not improved by the existence of sanctions, and indeed may be made
worse since the threat of possible punishment makes violation less attractive to the
agent.
Thus while either of the approaches—removing or sanctioning prohibited
actions—may be effective in closed systems (providing they are simple enough for a
model covering every eventuality to be constructed), they cannot be sure to cope
with the unexpected events and states that will arise in an open system, where not
every possibility can be envisaged or modelled. In such cases we may find that the
very reasons which led to the adoption of a norm will require the agent to violate
that very same norm. Value based reasoning offers the means to perform exactly the
purpose driven reasoning required in these situations, which can explain both the
general effectiveness of the norm (as illustrated in previous sections), and the need
to violate it in some particular situations. We will, with an everyday traffic example,
illustrate use of value based reasoning in deciding both to violate, and how to
violate, norms. Before doing we so, we briefly review how rule breaking in AI and
Law has been formalised in the literature.
4.2 Rule breaking in AI and law
That rules need to be broken should come as no surprise to anyone involved in AI
and Law, or AI generally, although the issue is usually termed rule defeasibility,
rather than rule breaking or rule violation. In practice, very few rules do not permit
exceptions, and not all exceptions are foreseeable, and so the exceptions cannot be
represented ex ante as negative antecedents. Thus given the defeasible rule if x is a
bird x can fly, there are many exceptions: flightless birds (e.g., penguins, kiwis and
ostriches); a particular bird may be crippled, or temporarily unwell; the bird may
have its feet set in concrete; the parrot may be dead, and so on. But, however many
exceptions we list, it will always be possible to think of another one, and so some
other way of handling the defeasibility is needed. Non-monotonic reasoning of this
kind was perhaps the key concern of AI in the 80s and early 90s, and given the
impracticality of listing all exceptions in rules’ antecedents, a key concern was how
to arbitrate between conflicting rules (e..g, the rule that most birds fly and the rule
that most ostriches do not fly). A popular principle for adjudicating between
conflicting rules was to prefer the more specific rule (e.g. Simari and Loui 1992) so
that the rule relating to ostriches is more specific, and so preferred to that relating to
birds. In AI and Law, principles such as Lex specialis derogat legi generali (prefer
the specific rule), Lex posterior derogat legi priori (prefer the later rule to earlier
rules) and Lex superior derogat legi inferiori (prefer the rule originating from the
superior source, national to local, Supreme Court to Appeal Court, etc) have been
21 This is known in economics as the Theory of the Second Best (e.g. Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).
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used (e.g., Valente 1995; Prakken 1991). A general account of legal principles and
their use in resolving normative conflicts can be found in Verheij et al. (1998). A
final method of addressing conflicting rules was to specifically indicate which has
priority either by relying on their order in the program code (e.g., Sergot et al.
1986), or by the use of explicit priority rules (derived from precedent cases) as in
Prakken and Sartor (1998).
Rarely, however, were AI and Law systems presented as coming to decisions:
rather they were presented as proving the literal consequences of the law, as in
Sergot et al. (1986), offering a suggestion which the user could accept or reject, or
presenting both sides of the arguments for the user to choose between, as in HYPO
(Ashley 1990) and CATO (Aleven 1997). Much of the work taken from general AI
is directed towards theoretical reasoning, but legal decision making can be seen as
practical reasoning, as argued for in Atkinson and Bench-Capon (2005). Giving a
legal verdict can be seen (Al-Abdulkarim et al. 2016) as making a performative
utterance, in the sense of Austin (1975), that is performing an action, rather than
making a classification. Viewing legal decision making in this way sees the legal
decision as a choice between two actions—decide for plaintiff or decide for
defendant—and so brings it within the purview of value based practical reasoning as
described above. The idea of value based reasoning in fact has its origins in law.
The basic idea is that the strength of a rule depends on the values its promotes, and
the preferences between values of its audience. That is, as explained in Bench-
Capon (2003), that the acceptability of an argument depends on the values of its
audience, an idea taken from the jurisprude Perelman (Perelman 1971, 1980). The
notion was introduced into AI and Law in Berman and Hafner (1993), although
there values were called purposes. Berman and Hafner argued that given conflicting
precedents, one should follow the precedent which promoted the preferred purpose.
This idea was developed in AI and Law, most fully in Bench-Capon and Sartor
(2003) and evaluated empirically in Chorley and Bench-Capon (2005). Reasoning
about the promotion and demotion of values was also formalised (in Deflog) in
Verheij (2013).
4.3 Road traffic example
This section considers an aspect of everyday life where violation of the general
norm is very common: the law that drivers should drive on the left (in the UK, on
the right in many other countries). The law is intended to avoid collisions, and so
promote the values of Progress and Safety. But on every journey, it is necessary to
violate this law if progress is to be maintained: obstructions such as parked cars and
roadworks, the need to overtake slow moving vehicles and cyclists and emergencies
such as a pedestrian or animal stepping in front of the car, may all lead drivers to
move to the right. But the question remains: when is it desirable to do so?
We will not give the full AATS here, since it would contain a lot of states and
details which are not needed in our context, but we will give a sufficient fragment to
allow the consideration of the relevant situations. Our AATS will represent relevant
features of the states that can occur. For our example we consider:
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• Whether there is an obstruction and whether it is moving or stationary (0 = clear,
1 = slow moving, 2 = stationary).
• Whether there is an on-coming vehicle and whether it can stop safely or not (0 =
no on-coming, 1 = can stop safely, 2 = cannot stop).
• Whether our own vehicle can stop safely (0 = can stop safely, 1 = cannot stop
safely).
• Whether there has been22 a collision (0 = no collision, 1(x, y) = x has collided
with y).
For actions, both our own vehicle and the on-coming will be able to continue,
change lane, stop, slow, or mount the pavement. For values we consider our own
progress and safety (P(s) and S(s)), the progress and safety of the on-coming
(P(o) and S(o)) and the safety of any pedestrians in the area (S(p)).
Now consider the transitions from the state where there is a stationary obstacle,
and both ourselves and the on-coming could stop safely, and there has been no
collision (2100). In this case there are a number of joint actions involving self and
on-coming as shown in Table 1. Additionally, if one or both mount the pavement
pedestrians may or may not be hit, depending on whether we get lucky or unlucky
(often represented by including Nature in the joint action).
In the actions J1–J15 self obeys the norm, whereas J16–J20 and J21–J25
represent different ways of violating the norm. J1–J10 all result in self colliding
with the obstacle, which demotes both P(s) and S(s). J11–15 do not demote S(s) but
do demote P(s). Thus complying with the law will demote one or both of the values
the norm was designed to promote, (although it does allow the on-coming to
continue without threat to any of its values). We should therefore consider violating
the norm. Suppose we go on to the right hand lane. Now J16 and J17 result in a
head-on collision, which demotes all of P(s), P(o), S(s) and S(o). J18 demotes
P(o) and J19 demotes both P(o) and S(o). J20 may or not demote S(p) for a variable
number of pedestrians. Similarly J21–J25 will jeopardise the safety of an unknown
number of pedestrians. We can therefore make a choice. If our desire for progress is
insufficient to lead us to risk our safety (and the safety of others) we have to stop. If,
however, we are sufficiently reckless that our desire for progress is such that we are
willing to risk a collision we should change lane and hope that J18 is achieved, so
that while P(o) is demoted, the threat to safety is avoided. This relies on the
(normally acceptable) assumption that the on-coming agent will be less reckless
than we are. J20–J25 are possible if we don’t trust the on-coming to stop, but this
poses the risk of an even more serious accident if we hit pedestrians. At this point
we could either construct arguments for the other agents involved acting in certain
ways (the on-coming driver can’t be as reckless as I am, or there will not be any
pedestrians at this time of night) in the manner of Atkinson and Bench-Capon
(2007), or perform an expected value calculation as recommended in Atkinson and
Bench-Capon (2016). Here most of us will choose to obey the norm. But if there is
no on-coming, then we can change lane and violate the norm with no risk to safety.
This will be better both than obeying the law or mounting the pavement, however
22 The collision will occur during the transition.
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unlikely we consider it to be that pedestrians are present. Thus value based
reasoning can tell us both when to violate the norm and how to violate it.
5 What makes a moral audience?
As the discussion in Sect. 4.3 showed, there may be more than one morally
acceptable ordering on values: morality may dictate only a partial order. Some other
orderings, such as one which licensed a refusal to pay the grasshopper even when
her singing had been requested and there is a surplus available to do so, are not
morally acceptable.23 Also we have seen how different norms may evolve in
different societies, driven by circumstance or by the preferences of its members.
What we must do if we are to unleash autonomous agents on the world is to provide
our agents with an acceptable ordering on which to base their reasoning, so that their
choices will be acceptable to the societies in which they act. In order to do so, we
need to look at the value order (total or partial) prevailing in that society. As noted
in work on AI and Law, the decisions made by courts often manifest an ordering on
values. The case law decisions often turn on the value preferences the judge wishes
to express. This use of social purposes to justify judicial decisions was introduced to
AI and Law in Berman and Hafner (1993) and more formally presented in Bench-
Capon and Sartor (2003). Thus we may look to the law as one source for our value
orderings: the assumption being that the moral order is at least compatible with the
order reflected in legal decisions. Note that this legal order need not be static and
may reflect changing social views and priorities. Although courts are supposed to be
bound by precedents (the doctrine of stare decisis) as noted by Mr Justice Marshall
in the US Supreme Court case of Furman v Georgia (408 U.S. 238 1972) there are
occasions when ‘‘stare decisis would bow to changing values’’.
Several methods of deriving an audience, in the sense of a value ordering, from a
set of cases have been proposed. In AGATHA (Chorley and Bench-Capon 2005) the
value ordering which best explains a set of cases was discovered by forming a
theory to explain a set of cases, and then using the theory construction operators of
Bench-Capon and Sartor (2003) to provide a better theory, in terms of explaining
Table 1 Joint actions for self and on-coming in state 2100
Self: on-coming Continue Slow Stop Change lane Mount pavement
Continue J1 J2 J3 J4 J5
Slow J6 J7 J8 J9 J10
Stop J11 J12 J13 J14 J15
Change lane J16 J17 J18 J19 J20
Mount pavement J21 J22 J23 J24 J25
23 This is important if we are to accommodate the fact that different preferences are exhibited by
different societies, or by the same society at different times, while avoiding the extreme relativist position
of ‘‘anything goes’’.
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more cases, until the best available theory was found. In Bench-Capon et al. (2007),
given a VAF and a set of arguments to be accepted, the audiences (if any) to which
that set is acceptable is determined by means of a dialogue game. In that paper the
ordering need not be fully determined (a specific audience): it is possible that the
desired set of arguments can be accepted by several audiences, represented as a
partial order on the values. In Modgil and Bench-Capon (2008), the VAF is
rewritten as a meta-level argumentation framework (metalevel frameworks are more
fully explored in Modgil and Bench-Capon (2010)), from which value orderings can
emerge, or be ‘formed’, as a result of dialogue games based on the rewritten
frameworks. If desired explicit arguments for value orderings can be made using the
Extended Argumentation Frameworks of Modgil (2009) which allow attacks to
attack attacks as well as arguments.
As well as legal cases, we can identify the approved value orderings from stories,
using techniques for deriving character motives from choices with respect to
actions, originally targetted at explaining the actions of people involved in legal
cases in Bex et al. (2009). Stories are often used to persuade people to adopt
particular value orders, as with the fable and the parable we have considered in this
paper. The notion of using didactic stories as arguments for value orderings was
explored in Bex and Bench-Capon (2014) and Bex et al. (2014). Since stories like
fables and parables were written specifically to advocate particular value orderings,
they are highly suited to our purposes. The values concerned are typically clear, the
choices sharp and the correct decisions clearly signposted, leaving little room for
doubt as to the recommended preference.
We do not propose data mining or machine learning methods here. Although
such methods can discover norms from a set of cases represented as facts and
outcomes (e.g Wardeh et al. 2009), the discovered norms derive their authority from
the amount of support in the dataset. They are suited to finding rules, but not
exceptions, and it is exceptional cases, where norms need to be violated, that interest
us. In law, however, single cases may, if the decision is made at the appropriate
level by the appropriate authority, form important precedents, identifying apparent
exceptions to existing norms, closing gaps and resolving conflicts, often revealing or
choosing between value orderings as they do so.
As noted above, these methods may produce not a specific audience, but rather a
set of audiences, all of which conform to and explain the prevailing decisions. If this
is so the question arises as to whether it is desirable or undesirable for all agents to
be drawn from the same audience. To unify the audience would be, in a multi-agent
system, to impose the designer’s view as to what is moral, and in a human society
give rise to a homogeneous, conformist culture. Often, however, a degree of
diversity may prove welcome, leading to different agents occupying different social
roles. cf. Durkheim (1893)’s notion that an advanced society promotes specialisa-
tion and division of labour. This is something that could be determined through
future empirical investigation).
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6 Discussion
When thinking about the foundations of norms, it is necessary to go beyond the
norms themselves and think about their rationales in the particular societies in
which they are found. We have argued that value-based practical reasoning applied
to a model of society expressed as an AATS?V provides the machinery to model
this kind of reasoning. Much current work on norm emergence and norm design is
done using either simulations of public goods games or by proving properties of
such games as in Shoham and Tennenholtz (1997), or by performing model
checking on state transition diagrams as in Wooldridge and van der Hoek (2005).
The first approach has given some insights, but the necessary simplifications, and
assumptions about the homogeneity of agents, suggest that there are limitations to
the approach. These doubts are strengthened by the fact that the behaviour of people
observed empirically in experiments using such games does not support the model
used (Engel (2011) for the Dictator game and Oosterbeek et al. (2004) for the
Ultimatum game). The second approach also has a view of agents as highly goal
directed, and tends to simplify its representation of norms by removing transitions
representing forbidden actions. This means that it is highly effective at proving
properties of the system, such as efficacy and liveness when the norms are complied
with and for verifying the design of norms, but less good in explaining where the
norms come from in the first place, and why the agents wish to pursue them. This is
problematic if we are looking for a justification (other than a pragmatic one) so that
the norm subjects can be persuaded rather than simply accept the norms imposed by
a designer. We believe that the use of value-based argumentation provides a finer
grained account of the reasoning involved, and is therefore better placed to account
for the norms that emerge from different social set-ups and how they can be
justified.
In Sect. 3 we described how two norms might be justified by applying value
based argumentation to a scenario modelling a simple society. One is a primary
norm, while the other provides a natural way of punishing transgressions of the
primary norm (and a way of removing transgressors). We believe that although the
model is simple, it is a not implausible representation of a primitive agricultural
society. Subsequently we described how making the model more sophisticated
would lead to other norms, and more importantly to the need to introduce additional
values (some of which may be metavalues promoted and demoted by value
orderings rather than actions) and to make finer grained discriminations both in
values and in actions. Thus play becomes seen as the socially beneficial playa and
the indulgent playd and a need to discriminate the value of honesty according to the
relationship between the agents involved in the transaction may become apparent.
Unfortunately the provision of detailed models, and the particular arguments that
they support, is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Atkinson and Bench-Capon
(2016) for a discussion of how different value profiles lead to different behaviours in
the Ultimatum game): all that was possible here is to sketch how additions to the
model would result in different norms, and so give a flavour of the process.
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We believe that such detailed models would indeed provide a fruitful way of
analysing and explaining social developments. Our account here for example,
coheres well with the account of social development found in Durkheim (1893).
Durkheim suggests that in a ‘‘primitive’’ society people act and think alike with a
collective or common conscience, which is what allows social order to be
maintained. In such a society laws tend to be highly repressive. Both of these are
true of the model presented in Sect. 3, where there is a norm (SN1) to be followed
by all and transgressions are effectively punished by death through SN2. Durkheim
further argues that in an advanced, industrial, capitalist society, the complex
division of labor means that people are allocated in society according to merit and
rewarded accordingly, and that diversity is embraced rather than opposed. This
accords with our discussion of the norms that develop as surplus production
increases, and the development of exchanges enabled by SN6, leading to the
increasing prevalence and diversity of service work, rather than food production.
Within this framework we could, for example, explore the different norms that
emerge when the surplus is due to a general rise in productivity, and when it is the
result of an external boost to wealth, as in sixteenth century Spain. Note also that the
sophisticated societies require increased cooperation (supported by norms such as
SN6 and values such as Trust and Honesty) and tend to increase the degree of
commercial exchanges between agents. It was these two factors that were found to
lead to the greatest deviation from the classical model in the Ultimatum Games
studied in Henrich et al. (2001), supporting the view that the more sophisticated the
society the less adequate the model provided by simple public goods game
simulations. Thus, even if simulations provide a good account of how initial norms
emerge, investigating their development may require a finer grained approach.
7 Concluding remarks
We have argued in this paper for the position that as agents display more and more
autonomy and are starting (as, for example, drones and driverless cars) to interact
more and more with the real world, they need to be given a capacity to reason
explicitly with norms, in particular so that they can detect situations in which their
norms need to be violated, and to choose the best way to violate them. While
regimented systems and the rigid following of fixed rules might be adequate for
agents working with limited autonomy in a closed environment, they are insufficient
to allow agents to participate in the real world where they may be called upon to
make life or death decisions. We have further argued that one way to provide this
capacity is to make use of the value based practical reasoning techniques developed
over the last decade. These techniques have the potential to explain why a particular
society has the norms it does, and when and how these norms should be violated.
The literature also offers a number of approaches in which the value orders for
various societies can be derived from the legal decisions taken and the stories told in
those societies. Note that we would expect both inter and intra cultural variation,
and evolution over time. Such matters can be explored and evaluated through
simulations of the sort found in Lloyd-Kelly et al. (2012) and Mahmoud et al.
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(2015). For a finer grained, qualitative evaluation, the techniques developed can be
applied to classic moral dilemmas such as whether a diabetic may be allowed to
steal insulin from another (the Hal and Carla case discussed in Christie 2012) and
Phillipa Foot’s famous Trolley Problem originally stated in Foot (2002) and recently
revived in Bonnefon et al. (2016).
Future work will need to investigate several aspects of value based reasoning,
including: inducing value orderings; consideration of the extents to which values are
promoted/demoted; and how value orderings can be applied to situations that differ
(in some tangible way that suggests novelty) from the ones that originally gave rise
to them. We will also wish to use Extended Argumentation Frameworks to model
the effect of making the value preferences explicit, and to enable different value
preferences to be argued for.
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